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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002220

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SUBJECT: IRAQI POLICE PERFORMANCE IN BAGHDAD

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C/REL MNF-I) SUMMARY: According to the May assessments from U.S. police transition teams in eleven Baghdad districts and municipalities, the Iraqi police show signs of progress in leadership and operational capability, especially in neighborhoods where Joint Security Stations have been established. The major hindrances to continued progress across all eleven districts surveyed are: acute manpower shortages, a nearly non-existent logistical system, and Shia militia influence. These shortcomings severely challenge progress and, ultimately, the long term sustainability of the service. According to some of our troops, if the embedded teams were not in place, police services in parts of Baghdad would likely collapse. MNF-I leaders are aware of and concerned by the police shortcomings and by their inability to contribute more effectively than they do to the Baghdad Security Plan. GEN Petraeus has directed a "Police Summit" meeting to be held in mid-July to review the vision for police in Baghdad and to determine the way ahead. END SUMMARY.

Positive: Leadership

¶2. (C/REL MNF-I) Of the eleven districts and municipalities assessed by U.S. police transition teams, eight have some effective leaders who work hard, coordinate closely with the Coalition and Iraqi Army, and try to remain non-sectarian. Overall, the surveyed districts on Baghdad's west and south sides, comprised of; Abu Ghraib, Kadhamiyah, Rasheed, Mahmudiyah, and Mansour seem to be the weakest in leadership, with Abu Ghraib ranked as the worst due to a district headquarters commander who is "disinterested in (Police Transition Team) PTT support." Kadhamiyah district also received low marks on leadership, with a number of commanders suspected of involvement in or passivity toward militia activity. In general, while we have a few good leaders in most districts, all districts need more, particularly at the deputy and middle-management level. The situation appears somewhat better in the Rusafa Command on Baghdad's east side which includes the districts and municipalities of Al Thawra (Sadr City), Adhamiyah, Bab Sheikh, Karada, Salhiya, New Baghdad, and Doura.

Positive: Joint Security Stations

¶3. (C/REL MNF-I) The PTT team leaders believe that Joint Security Stations contribute strongly to the overall performance of the Iraqi police. Ten of the eleven assessments mention having Joint Security Stations within their districts and eight single them out as agents for progress. It appears that Abu Ghraib did not have a JSS at the time the report was filed. The Joint Security Stations

in Kadhamiyah district, specifically in the neighborhoods in Hurriya and Kadhamiyah and the "several Joint Security Stations" in New Baghdad have led to an improvement in communication among the ISF. They also report that police response time has "decreased dramatically" with the establishment of Joint Security Stations. Mahmudiyah uses its JSS for training drills and has attributed its set up to an increase in tips from local residents. Eight districts report the Joint Security Stations have improved overall force protection in the area.

¶4. (C/REL MNF-I) The Coalition reports that many Joint Security Stations will continue to operate as local police stations once Fardh al Qanoon ends and the Coalition and Iraqi Army units leave the urban areas. With this in mind, the Coalition is strategically placing the Joint Security Stations in neighborhoods. They are located among the residents and around key public institutions.

Positive: Operational Capability

¶5. (C/REL MNF-I) Iraqi police operational capability continues to improve in eight districts: Al Thawra (Sadr City), Adhamiyah, Karada, Salhiya, New Baghdad, Kadhamiyah, Doura, and the city of Mahmudiyah. This progress is largely attributed to Coalition mentorship and Iraqi National Police and Army support. The PTT in New Baghdad attributed success to experience noting "many have been police for several years." Reports on Mansour and Bab Sheik did not discuss operational capability other than to rank the Iraqi police as two on a scale from one to four, meaning the police need minimal Coalition or other ISF assistance. Abu Ghraib police were considered "completely ineffective" with the only

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security in the area provided by the Iraqi Army.

¶6. (C/REL MNF-I) Militia influence and intimidation are the primary obstacles to improving police operational capability and reliability in most eastern districts including Sadr City, Adhamiyah, and Bab Sheik, and Doura. PTTs reported from two areas -- the city of Mahmudiyah and district of Kadhamiyah -- that constant Coalition supervision is needed to ensure the police do not engage in ethno-sectarian motivated operations or detentions. PTTs also noted that police in JAM-infiltrated portions of Adhamiyah, Salhiya, and Bab Sheik have been more willing in the past month to go after rogue elements and JAM militias - resulting in increased retaliatory attacks against the police and their facilities. After police arrested a JAM leader, Maj Awad, the Ur station was attacked three times in two weeks by RPGs and small arms fire. Prior to the detention, the station had not experienced an attack in over a year. Embeds report Doura-based police who are largely Shia refuse to patrol or respond to incidents in Sunni neighborhoods for fear of attack by AQI elements. As for Southern Baghdad Province, the Mahmudiyah city police performance seems to suffer the most from militia influence and intimidation.

¶7. (C/REL MNF-I) PTTs report minimal training opportunities in nine of the eleven districts. They attribute this deficiency to personnel and resource shortage as well as a lack of Iraqi police interest. Embeds, however, report good training programs in Adhamiyah and New Baghdad. In the near term, it is projected that on-the-job training and interaction with Coalition and other Iraqi security forces, rather than training, will further police operational capability.

Weakness: Severe Police Shortage, Especially in Sunni Areas

¶8. (C/REL MNF-I) Reports indicate all districts suffer from serious personnel shortages, particularly the Sunni areas.

The primary reasons for deficiencies are the high levels of chronic absenteeism; high rates of unplanned police transfers; and low recruitment/hiring efforts by MOI, especially in Sunni areas. In May, the average police daily strength in Abu Ghraib was 31 percent. This shortage seemed to only benefit the district commander, who allegedly pockets the salaries of the AWOL police and charges any AWOL who wants to return to service a USD 500 fee. The Mahmudiyah district reported a 75 percent shortfall in authorized strength. Mansour and Doura, both extremely volatile areas were operating with 32 percent and 39 percent of their assigned strength respectively in May. The PTT in Doura reports only 14 percent of police conduct daily patrols in the Sunni neighborhoods. On the east side, the Adhamiyah PTT concluded that about 30 percent of the police are present on a daily basis. Kadhamiyah, Sadr City, and Karada also report serious police shortages.

¶9. (C/REL MNF-I) Some Sunni neighborhoods within Mansour such as Ameriya and Gahzaliyah have no local police while the Sunni enclave of Kadra has a paltry force of 50 police. The police shortage in Ameriya has led, in part, to the development of a Coalition-supported locally armed group to fight Al Qaeda. While it may seem at first glance that the uprising of locals to fight Al Qaeda is positive, in the long term what is needed is a sufficient locally-recruited police force, trained and equipped by the Ministry of Interior. (NOTE: Post understands from the U.S. commanders in Western Baghdad that the MOI has not acted on repeated requests from the Coalition and the Iraqi police commander to hold recruitment drives in Sunni neighborhoods. Sunni neighborhoods in Doura do not have an active police service because, according to the PTT, the Shia-dominated police service fear AQI and thus refuse to operate in the area. END NOTE.)

Weakness: Logistics

¶10. (C/REL MNF-I) All eleven districts suffer from acute logistics and sustainment problems. Abu Ghraib and Mansour district logistic system is described as "slow or non-existent" and Karada is said to have "almost a complete lack of logistical support from the MOI headquarters." The report leads one to conclude that there is no established logistic supply chain to meet resource and funding needs at the local level from headquarters. Formal requests are repeatedly made by commanders but remain unfulfilled. Fuel shortages are described as serious in all districts,

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impacting operational capabilities. The deficiency limits police planning and patrolling activities. One district attributes the rise in IEDs along a main road to the shortage in fuel because police has had to stop actively patrolling the vicinity. The Bab Sheik district reported that for the winter months, the 400 assigned police received one winter coat and four shirts.

¶11. (C/REL MNF-I) The Coalition, and to some extent the Iraqi Army, contribute where they can to the police deficiencies. This is especially the case where Joint Security Stations are up and running. The logistic problem, however, if not remedied will ultimately lead to the downfall of the police service. In the near term, it appears they will be able to limp along because the Coalition is around to provide them the needed support to survive, but without Coalition presence sustainability is clearly in jeopardy until MoI logistics systems improve.

Weakness: Militia and AQI Influence

¶12. (C/REL MNF-I) Eight of the eleven embedded teams report that militia influence is hampering performance of the police. Within the Rusafa area command, four of six

districts report substantial influence of JAM on the police.

Many police are members of, complicit in, or intimidated by JAM elements, notably in Sadr City. Embeds report, however, that in the three of these areas -- Adhamiyah, Salhiya, and Bab Sheik -- police have been more willing in the past month to take on JAM elements. Retaliatory attacks, however, have been the consequence. And despite this stepped up action, JAM-suspected crime remains high in these areas with high rates of kidnapping, Extra-Judicial Killings (EJKs), and IED attacks. The Adhamiyah wall has disrupted both AQI and JAM elements, but dead bodies are on the rise from April to May and are attributed to be JAM-affiliated crime.

¶13. (C/REL MNF-I) The PTTs did not mention JAM or other militia influence in Salhiya and New Baghdad in Eastern Baghdad in their May assessment. The lack of mention of JAM influence in Salhiya is interesting given that the previous month's assessment stated "I think the only people safe in this district will be Shia, due to JAM infiltration. Most Sunnis have dislocated or have been targeted as Sunni terrorists. Shia targeting is rare... ISF target only AQI and Sunnis." The PTT in Doura attributes poor police performance to their valid fear of AQI attacks and the largely Sunni population's distrust of them. The Sunni population believes all ISF are JAM members, except for the IA units from the north operating in their territory.

¶14. (C/REL MNF-I) In Western and Southern Baghdad, two of the districts and municipalities surveyed -- Mahmudiyah and Kadhamiyah -- discuss the negative influence of militia on the police. Whereas Mahmudiyah used to be a hotbed for AQI, it is now reported as a JAM-riddled city in which the police are unable to counter because of intimidation and active participation. Kadhamiyah embeds say that militia influence is the biggest concern, and they have received "significant reporting" linking police and station commanders to militia activity. Mansour reported no JAM complicity among police but noted AQI attacks are on the rise due to the low number of local police patrolling the area. Abu Ghraib does not mention militia or terrorist influence on the police.

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